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Owners of private companies are typically highly underdiversiﬁed. In the USA, they have
on average 30% of their net worth invested in one company. This concentrated investment
exposes them to company-speciﬁc risk. It is often necessary that owners invest their own
wealth, because their companies provide no collateral and banks are reluctant to extend
unsecured loans. The theoretical literature suggests that underdiversiﬁcation increases the
cost of equity capital substantially. Underdiversiﬁed owners should only be willing to invest,
if the expected returns are high enough to provide a compensation for their exposure to
company-speciﬁc risk. However, so far it is not known whether owners of private companies
receive a compensation for this risk exposure. This paper tries to answer this question.
Two separate data sources are used for the analysis: the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF) and the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF). Both surveys include information
on private companies and on the wealth of their owners for the USA. Empirically, we measure
underdiversiﬁcation as the value of the equity investment in the private company divided
by the net worth of the owner. Net worth is calculated as the sum of personal assets minus
the sum of personal liabilities. Instrumental variables are used to deal with problems of
endogeneity.
The empirical results show a positive, signiﬁcant relationship between underdiversiﬁcation
and the proﬁtability of companies. There are two possible mechanisms: ﬁrst, owners can
select the projects in which they invest such that the expected returns are suﬃcient to cover
the cost of underdiversiﬁcation and, second, if owners are at the same time managers, they
can work harder to ensure the success of the company. More underdiversiﬁed owners have
better incentives to exert eﬀort, since their ﬁnancial well-being is more closely related to
company proﬁtability. The validity of both mechanisms is established using sub samples of
owners with and without an active management interest.
The results have important implications for the investment decisions at private companies.
Since underdiversiﬁcation increases required returns, it follows that the realisation of a busi-
ness idea depends on the scale of the required investment in relationship to the net worth
of the potential entrepreneur. If underdiversiﬁcation drives the required return above the
expected return of the project, then the business opportunity will not be realised.Underdiversiﬁcation in Private Companies -




Owners of private companies are often highly underdiversiﬁed which exposes them to
idiosyncratic risk. We investigate the consequences of underdiversiﬁcation at the com-
pany level. Information on US companies and their owners is obtained from the Survey
of Consumer Finances and the Survey of Small Business Finances. Underdiversiﬁca-
tion, measured as the share of the owner’s net worth invested in the company, has a
signiﬁcant positive relationship with proﬁtability, measured as the return on equity.
We identify two causes for this underdiversiﬁcation eﬀect: higher required returns and
higher eﬀort. The results have important consequences for investment decisions at
private companies.
JEL classiﬁcation: G32, G11
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Private companies rely for their ﬁnancing mostly on the equity investment of a limited
number of owners and on bank loans (Berger and Udell (1998)). Problems of asymmetric
information inﬂuence the ﬁnancing, because the eﬀort of the entrepreneur and the riskiness
of projects are diﬃcult to observe for outsiders. It follows that banks need to cope with moral
hazard and adverse selection, which can lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)).
This situation is aggravated by a lack of collateral in many companies, which could be pledged
to make the lending less risky. Because of the problems of asymmetric information it follows
that entrepreneurs need to invest their own wealth and that non-managing owners need to
invest an amount high enough to justify the monitoring costs. The required investment
volume is often large in relationship to the net worth of the owners – owners are therefore
often highly underdiversiﬁed. Underdiversiﬁcation means that a high share of the personal
wealth is invested in one company.
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) document that average returns to private eq-
uity are not higher than average returns to public equity, even though owners of private
companies are often highly underdiversiﬁed. This is puzzling, since theoretical models show
that underdiversiﬁcation increases the cost of equity capital substantially (see Kerins et al.
(2004) and Heaton and Lucas (2000a)). We would therefore expect that owners require a
compensation for their exposure to idiosyncratic risk reﬂected in higher returns to private
equity. So far, it remains unclear whether owners do not require compensation for their
exposure to idiosyncratic risk or whether other reasons are responsible for the relatively
low returns to private equity. Or, to pose the problem diﬀerently, it is not known whether
idiosyncratic risk is priced in private companies. The answer to this question has impor-
tant implications for the investment decisions at private companies. If idiosyncratic risk is
priced, then the selection of projects depends on the underdiversiﬁcation of the owner, since
the underdiversiﬁcation inﬂuences the return required to make a project proﬁtable.
We test empirically whether there is an underdiversiﬁcation eﬀect, i.e. whether underdi-
versiﬁcation is related to higher company proﬁtability. We investigate two ways in which
owners can respond to underdiversiﬁcation. First, owners can require higher returns. They
can select the projects in which they invest such that the expected returns are suﬃcient to
provide compensation for the exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Second, if owners are at the
1same time managers, they can work harder to ensure the success of their company. The more
underdiversiﬁed they are, the more their ﬁnancial well-being depends on the proﬁtability of
the company.
Two data sources from the USA are used for the analysis: the Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances (SCF, wave 1989 to wave 2001) and the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF,
wave 1998). Both surveys were conducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Washington, DC. They are well-suited for this analysis, because they provide in-
formation on private companies and on the wealth of their owners.1 The SCF data has the
further advantage of diﬀerentiating between owners with and without an active management
interest. This allows the separate identiﬁcation of the two channels of the underdiversiﬁ-
cation eﬀect. Owners who are not at the same time managers do not inﬂuence company
proﬁtability through managerial activity. If there is a positive relationship between under-
diversiﬁcation and proﬁtability it must be due to higher required returns. In contrast, for
owner-managers any positive eﬀect could also be driven by higher eﬀort. The SCF provides
information on weekly hours worked for owner-managers, which can be used as a proxy for
eﬀort. It is therefore possible directly to test the second channel of the underdiversiﬁcation
eﬀect, namely whether underdiversiﬁcation increases eﬀort.
Empirically, we measure underdiversiﬁcation as the value of the equity investment in the
private company divided by the net worth of the owner. It is important to note that there is
no benchmark of zero underdiversiﬁcation. Every individual is exposed to some idiosyncratic
risk. For example, employees typically depend on the success of one company for most of
their labour income. Also, even if investments in the stock market are divided between
many companies, most investors do not achieve the theoretical ideal of full diversiﬁcation
of idiosyncratic risk. We approach underdiversiﬁcation from a relative and not from an
absolute perspective. The empirical measure allows a comparison of underdiversiﬁcation
between owners; it determines which owner has a higher degree of underdiversiﬁcation.
In our econometric analysis we ﬁnd that underdiversiﬁcation has a positive, signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the proﬁtability of companies, which can be either due to higher required returns or
1These surveys have been widely used in the literature, e.g. to examine lending relationships (Petersen
and Rajan (1994); Cole (1998)), agency costs (Ang et al. (2000); Bitler et al. (2004)), and returns to private
equity (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002)).
2to higher eﬀort. This eﬀect is smaller for richer owners, which is consistent with decreasing
relative risk aversion. For a sub-sample of owners who do not have an active management
interest, we also ﬁnd a positive relationship between underdiversiﬁcation and proﬁtability.
This supports the view that underdiversiﬁed owners require higher expected returns, since
higher eﬀort can be excluded as a cause. For owners who are at the same time managers we
establish a positive relationship between underdiversiﬁcation and eﬀort, measured as self-
reported weekly hours worked. Owner-managers who are ﬁnancially more dependent on the
success of their companies have a higher incentive to work hard.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the related literature;
Section 3 gives more detail on the data sets and deﬁnes the variables used in the analysis;
Section 4 develops the hypotheses; Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The prevalence of underdiversiﬁcation has been documented for the USA by Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jørgensen (2002). Households with an investment in private equity have, on average,
41% of their net worth invested in private equity. In addition to the concentration with
respect to the asset class, there is a concentration with respect to the selected investments.
85% of the total investment in private equity is, on average, invested in one actively managed
company. Owners are therefore exposed to the idiosyncratic risk of the company. The main
interest of the authors is the returns to private equity. With the SCF data they calculate
value-weighted returns for the intervals between two waves that take the appreciation of the
market value of equity and the retention of earnings into account. The returns are calculated
under several diﬀering assumptions and ﬁgures that range from 12.8% to 19.0% on average
over the three intervals covered are obtained. The authors draw attention to the puzzle that
the average return on private equity is not higher than the average return on public equity,
even though the owners are underdiversiﬁed. On average there seems to be no compensation
for idiosyncratic risk.
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) analyse average values, i.e. their study is at an
aggregate level. It has therefore to remain as open question whether underdiversiﬁed owners
do not receive a compensation for their exposure to idiosyncratic risk or whether the low
3returns have a diﬀerent explanation, for example the existence of non-pecuniary beneﬁts or
overoptimism by the owners. With an analysis at the company level, we directly test in this
paper whether underdiversiﬁcation and proﬁtability are related.
For public equity, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) predicts that idiosyncratic
risk is not priced, since investors have the opportunity to diversify. There is only a com-
pensation for the systemic risk component of the stock. In contrast, investors in private
equity cannot diversify. Theoretical models show that underdiversiﬁcation increases the cost
of equity capital for private companies. Kerins et al. (2004) use the CAPM to derive the
cost of capital for an underdiversiﬁed entrepreneur. In their model, the entrepreneur can
choose between an investment in the own company and the market. The relative weights of
the two assets determine the total risk of the portfolio. This total risk can be duplicated
by leveraging an investment in the market. From the levered market investment it is pos-
sible to calculate the returns that can be achieved in the market. These returns are the
opportunity cost of capital for the underdiversiﬁed portfolio. The authors use data on recent
high-technology IPOs to calculate the opportunity cost of capital. Information on the betas
and on the variance of returns of these companies is used. There is no information on actual
underdiversiﬁcation needed for this analysis – the authors calculate the cost of equity capital
for diﬀerent assumed levels of underdiversiﬁcation. This method shows that underdiversiﬁca-
tion considerably increases the cost of equity capital. This is also the conclusion reached by
the model of Heaton and Lucas (2000a). The theoretical models are complementary to the
analysis of this paper. The models establish that there are costs due to underdiversiﬁcation,
but they cannot test whether owners actually demand a compensation for their exposure to
idiosyncratic risk.
So far, data on underdiversiﬁcation has been rarely used in the literature. Heaney and
Holmen (2004) are an exception. They measure underdiversiﬁcation due to concentrated
investments in public companies for a sample comprised of the richest Swedes. The authors
use the cost of underdiversiﬁcation as a proxy for the value that controlling shareholders
attach to their control.
Himmelberg et al. (2002) argue that concentrated ownership should be related to better
company performance, since concentrated ownership leads to underdiversiﬁcation for which
a compensation is necessary. In a sample of public companies they ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of
4concentrated ownership, which they interpret accordingly. However, the authors do not use
information on the actual underdiversiﬁcation of owners. In order to clearly diﬀerentiate
between a positive incentive eﬀect from ownership and a positive eﬀect due to underdi-
versiﬁcation, it is necessary to separately control for the ownership share and the personal
underdiversiﬁcation of the owner.
This paper analyses how exposure to idiosyncratic risk inﬂuences required returns and
eﬀort by owners. Related to this topic is the literature considering the eﬀects of exposing risk-
averse managers to idiosyncratic risk through stock or stock options. For example, managers
value stock or stock options in their compensation contracts less, when they already have
greater parts of their wealth correlated with the value of the company (Lambert et al. (1991),
Kahl et al. (2003)). Also, risk aversion can inﬂuence the investment decisions of managers,
when they are exposed to company speciﬁc risk (Parrino et al. (2002), Morellec (2003)).
3 Data
3.1 Data Sources
The analysis is based on information from two diﬀerent surveys. Both the Survey of Con-
sumer Finances (SCF) and the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) provide infor-
mation on the ﬁnancial situation of owners and on their companies. The surveys aim to
be representative for households and companies in the USA. From the SCF the waves 1989,
1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001 are used. From the SSBF only the wave 1998 is used, because this
is the only wave with information on the net worth of owners. Both surveys were conducted
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC.
The Survey of Consumer Finances has the household as the primary unit of interest. The
main purpose of the survey is to document the amount and the composition of household
wealth. It therefore includes some questions on private companies owned by households.
For the purpose of this analysis two sub-samples are used. The ﬁrst sub-sample selects
all households with an active management interest in a private company. For households
that own several private companies, only the information about the largest one is used.2
2Of the households with an active management interest in private companies, 32% have a management
interest in more than one company.
5Overall, the sub-sample contains complete information on 4,973 households with an active
management interest in a private company. Of these, 4,324 companies are ﬁnally included in
the analysis. Observations for companies with an equity value below US-$ 1,000 are deleted,
because such small values of equity can lead to very implausible returns on equity ﬁgures.
Furthermore, companies are required to have positive sales and owners are required to have
positive private wealth, i.e. positive net worth not considering the equity investment. As a
further measure to ensure plausible return on equity values, the smallest and largest 1% of
observations of this variable are excluded. Although the ownership share of the household
is known, it is not clear whether the household is the largest owner. Households are asked
to give an estimate of the market value of their equity share. Since there is no quoted price
available, this value may be measured with error.3
For the second sub-sample of the SCF all households with ownership in a private business
in which they do not have an active management role are selected. The survey provides
information on the market value of the equity share owned and on the income that the
household has received from the company. This information is given separately for companies
of diﬀerent legal forms. Should a household have ownership in two or more companies of the
same legal form, then this information is only available as a sum for those companies. Overall,
information on 1,486 households with ownership in 2,090 (partly combined) companies is
available. The same selection rules as for the ﬁrst sub-sample apply, with the sole diﬀerence
that the minimum size of US-$ 1,000 applies to the equity share and not to the total equity.
Finally, information on 1,429 households and 1,925 companies is used.4
The Survey of Small Business Finances has the company as the primary unit of interest.
It provides information on 3,561 private companies with up to 500 employees from the non-
farm, non-ﬁnancial sectors. Financial data on the company, as well as information about
the largest owner, is available. Although it is known whether the company is run by a
hired manager, it is not known whether the largest owner is also active in the management.
The SSBF data diﬀerentiates between only three categories of total net worth of the owner:
the book value of the ownership share, the equity value of the primary residence and the
3See Kennickell et al. (2000) for more information on the 1998 SCF survey.
435.6% households have ownership in only one company. 62.8% of households have ownership in more
than one company, but each has a diﬀerent legal form.
6remaining net worth.5 As in the SCF sample, companies with equity values below US-$
1,000 are not included in the analysis. This survey contains a surprisingly high share of
21% of companies with negative equity values. (This issue is explored in more detail in
section 3.2.2.) Likewise, companies are required to have positive sales, positive assets and
owners are required to have positive private wealth. Since the SSBF data has more extreme
values, trimming of the return on equity variable is done to the 5% level. 2,337 companies
are ﬁnally included in the analysis.6
Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in tables A, B and C in the appendix.
3.2 Variable Deﬁnitions
3.2.1 Measurement of Underdiversiﬁcation
For the measurement of underdiversiﬁcation it is important to have information on the
owner’s equity investment in the company and on the owner’s net worth. The share of net
worth invested in the company can then be used as proxy for the underdiversiﬁcation. Net
worth is deﬁned as the sum of all assets minus the sum of all liabilities of the owner.
Two measures for the share of net worth invested (SNWI) are calculated. The ﬁrst method
considers only the value of the equity investment. This variable is denoted with SNWI A.
SNWI A =
(ownership share ∗ total value of equity)
net worth
This information is calculated for the largest owner of the company in the SSBF data,
whereas in the SCF data the responding household needs not be the largest owner. An
additional diﬀerence is that value of equity relates to the estimated market value in the SCF
data and to the book value in the SSBF data.
5Browning et al. (2003) consider problems that may arise when questions about aggregate values are asked
in surveys. They discuss the usefulness of total expenditure questions as opposed to asking for expenditure in
diﬀerent categories. First, rounding can happen, i.e. values may be noisy. However, even with rounding, the
total expenditure questions still contain valuable information. Second, it is possible that total expenditure
is underestimated, if only one question about the total is asked.
6More detailed information on the 1998 SSBF survey is available in Bitler et al. (2001).
7The second calculation takes into account that the equity investment is not the only
way in which the owner’s assets are tied to the company. Owners can also give personal
guarantees for company loans, they can use private assets as collateral and they can extend
loans to the company. The second measure for underdiversiﬁcation, SNWI B, takes these
possibilities into account. It is calculated according to the following formula:
SNWI B =
(ownership share ∗ total value of equity) + guarantees + collateral + loans
net worth
The SCF states directly the amount of loans that are guaranteed by the household, the
value of household assets that are used as collateral and the volume of loans that are extended
to the company by the household. The SSBF data, having the company as primary unit of
interest, gives only the sum over all owners for these variables. This information is therefore
multiplied by the ownership share of the largest owner to get an approximation of this
owner’s personal involvement.
The measures SNWI A and SNWI B document a considerable degree of underdiversiﬁ-
cation. For owners with active management interest, SNWI A is on average 33.7% (SCF)
and 27.7% (SSBF). By additionally considering guarantees, collateral and loans, the average
value of SNWI B is 3.6% and 5.8% higher, respectively.
If owners exhibit decreasing relative risk aversion, then, at higher levels of wealth, they
will be less aﬀected by the same degree of underdiversiﬁcation. Therefore we also control
for the level of private wealth. Private wealth is deﬁned as net worth minus the value of
the equity investment. It measures the assets that are not directly invested in the company.
The Dummy high wealth is equal to one, if the owner belongs to the highest third of
the distribution of private wealth in the respective sample. The cut-oﬀ point is 3.3 million
US-$ for the SCF and 0.6 million US-$ for the SSBF. This dummy is interacted with the
measures of underdiversiﬁcation in the empirical analysis. The wealth levels in the SSBF
are smaller than in the SCF, since the SSBF is restricted to private companies with at most
500 employees. From the descriptive statistics in table B in the appendix it can be seen that
households who hold equity without an active management interest are considerably richer
than households who hold private equity with an active management interest. Private equity
as a pure ﬁnancial investment opportunity is especially attractive for richer households. In
8both the SCF and the SSBF data owners with more private wealth have on average a lower
degree of underdiversiﬁcation.
We now turn to the discussion of whether SNWI is a good measure for the underdiversi-
ﬁcation and the risk exposure of owners. Owners are exposed to several types of risk. For
example, there is a concentration of income from one source and the possibility that the
value of the ownership share can fall. These risks certainly increase with SNWI. However,
some owners have unlimited liability, i.e. they are liable for company obligations with all
their private assets. In practise, even owners with unlimited liability lose only their equity
investment in a bankruptcy, if their private assets are below exemption limits stipulated by
the bankruptcy law. Fan and White (2003, p. 3) give evidence of the limited size of the
personal losses in a bankruptcy. They state that: “they [entrepreneurs] often have no non-
exempt assets”. Therefore also for owners with unlimited liability, SNWI is a good proxy
for the risk exposure.7
3.2.2 Company Proﬁtability
Return on Equity (ROE), deﬁned as pre-tax proﬁts divided by total equity, is used as
a measure for company proﬁtability. The SCF data measures equity with an estimated
market value and the SSBF with the book value. The proﬁt ﬁgures in both surveys are
reported before the payment of corporate and income tax. To make the numbers better
comparable across legal forms, we calculate the corporate tax, which has to be paid only by
C-corporations, and subtract it from the reported proﬁts.8
7If a private company goes bankrupt in the USA with obligations still outstanding, an owner with un-
limited liability can declare personal bankruptcy in order to dispose of the company debt. It is possible to
give up all assets that are not exempt, but to keep future earnings (chapter 7) or to keep all assets and agree
to a repayment plan to repay part of the debts (chapter 13). The exemption rules diﬀer between states,
but typically deﬁne an upper limit for home equity as well as for other personal assets. If owners agree to
keep up payments on loans that are secured on their home or private car, they do not lose these assets.
Furthermore, if the retirement savings are not excluded from the bankruptcy proceeding in the ﬁrst place,
they can be kept if the amount is reasonably necessary for the support upon retirement.
8C- and S-corporations are both characterised by limited liability. C-corporations have to pay corporation
tax for proﬁts that are paid out to the shareholders. In contrast, proﬁts of S-corporations are only charged
with the personal income tax rate of their owners. Corporate tax rates diﬀer according to the size of proﬁts
and have changed over the years. For our calculations we use the historical rates according to tax brackets
9The average of ROE in the SCF data is at 47.7% quite high. This is an average that gives
equal weight to all observations. If one calculates an average that is weighted by the value
of equity, one obtains a substantially lower number of 15.6%, comparable to the result of
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002).
As opposed to the SCF, where the value of equity is asked directly, the SSBF calculates
the value of equity as the diﬀerence of the company’s assets and liabilities. It is likely
that company assets and liabilities are measured with error, because most respondents are
not required by law to draw up a balance sheet. Any measurement error in assets and
liabilities is passed on to the book value of equity. In the SSBF data it seems that assets are
on average underreported, because a high share of 21% of companies have negative equity
values. Underreporting of assets is consistent with the relatively high values for return on
equity. Even the value-weighted average is, at 42.1%, quite high. Since SNWI is not well
deﬁned if the equity value is negative, only observations with positive equity values can be
included in the empirical analysis.9
It is important to discuss whether there are problems in the measurement of ROE that
could lead to a positive relationship between proﬁtability and SNWI that would not be
driven by higher required returns or higher eﬀort. We ﬁrst address the inﬂuence of tax
evasion. Longenecker et al. (1996) ﬁnd in a survey of 424 entrepreneurs that 54% of them
have faced the issue of underreporting taxable income. However, the survey does not contain
information on the size of underreporting. The question is to what extent the survey data
used in this analysis can be aﬀected by tax evasion. King and Ricketts (1980) and Parker
(1984) conclude from an evaluation of the 1977 economic census that households report their
true income to surveys, if the surveys don’t use tax forms as a basis. The SCF is not based on
tax forms, whereas the SSBF refers respondents to tax statements for the company details
but not for the wealth questions. Tax evaders will report lower values of ROE and also
lower values of SNWI to the extent that they saved the gains from tax evasion. Therefore a
positive relationship between SNWI and ROE can be inﬂuenced by tax evasion. However,
which can be found at www.taxpolicycenter.org and, for 1994 onwards, at the home page of the American
Internal Revenue Service, www.irs.gov.
9The analysis was also done with share of net worth invested set equal to zero for observations with
negative equity or negative net worth. A dummy for negative equity and a dummy for negative net worth
were included. The results are robust with respect to this modiﬁcation.
10since SNWI is a stock variable shaped by many other factors, this eﬀect is likely to be too
small to drive the results.
As the surveys provide only cross-sectional information, it is not possible to control for
entry and exit. There is a higher probability that a company exits shortly after the survey
has taken place, if the entrepreneur was overoptimistic when starting the company. Overop-
timism likely leads to a high investment volume and to low returns, i.e. overoptimism yields
a negative relationship between SNWI and ROE. This makes it more diﬃcult to identify an
underdiversiﬁcation eﬀect.
Investments of venture capitalists may reduce the underdiversiﬁcation of the other owners.
For venture capitalists, the capital gains from selling the company are an important source of
income, whereas the proﬁtability of the company during the investment period may be low.
This could lead to a positive relationship between SNWI and ROE. However, overall less than
1% of all private equity (i.e. equity in sole proprietorships, partnerships and corporations
in private ownership) in the USA is held by venture capitalists (Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jørgensen, 2002). This is also reﬂected in the SSBF data, which provides information on
equity increases. Out of the 3,561 companies covered, only 4 raised equity from a venture
capital ﬁrm in the year prior to the survey.
3.2.3 Other Characteristics of Companies and Owners
Following are deﬁnitions for the other control variables. Most variable names speak for
themselves, but there are diﬀerences in the precise deﬁnition of the variables across the two
surveys.
We consider the company-related variables ﬁrst.
Company size is the logarithm of the number of employees in the SCF data. The SSBF
data covers only companies up to 500 employees. For this data set, company size is measured
directly as the number of employees.
Company age is deﬁned as the number of years since the company was started or
acquired.
Industry dummies in the SCF data diﬀerentiate between six industries. There is no
industry information if the value of the equity that the household owns is above US-$ 100
million. The SSBF data identiﬁes nine diﬀerent industries. Tables D and E in the appendix
11give an overview on the distribution of the companies according to industry.
Dummies legal form diﬀerentiate between sole proprietorships, partnerships, S- and
C-corporations.
Dummies type of company acquisition indicate whether the company was founded,
purchased or inherited.
It is important to know that the SCF data includes information on assets, such as private
businesses, only at the household level, whereas education and job characteristics are included
separately for the head of the household and the spouse. To be able to control for individual
characteristics, we determine whether the head of the household or the spouse is the main
owner according to the job characteristics. If only one person is working for the business,
then this person is the main owner. If both are working for the business, then the single
person being self-employed in the main job is the main owner. If both are self-employed
in the main job, then the main owner is the one with the higher number of weekly hours
worked in the main job. If both are working for the business, but neither is self-employed
in the main job, then the single person being self-employed in the second job is the main
owner. If both are self-employed in the second job, then the main owner is again the person
with the higher hours of work in the second job.
The owner-related variables listed below are used in the analysis.
Value primary residence refers to the market value of the owner’s primary residence in
the SCF data. In the SSBF data only the equity value (i.e. market value minus mortgages)
is available. The value of this variable is set to zero, if the owner is renting the primary
residence.
Dummy home owner has a value of one if the owner owns the primary residence.
Experience is calculated in the SCF data from the information on the work history of
the head of the household and the spouse. Years in full-time employment are counted as
such and years in part-time employment are weighted with a factor of 0.5. The variable
refers to all kind of occupations. In the SSBF data experience is deﬁned as the number of
years owning or managing a company.
Hours worked is only available in the SCF data. It is the self-reported hours of work in
the main job in a normal week. This information is used for the empirical analysis if, ﬁrst,
the owner states to be working in or participating in the operation of the company and,
12second, the owner states to be self-employed in the main job.
Ownership share refers to the share of equity owned. In the SCF data the household is
not necessarily the largest owner, whereas the SSBF data always refers to the largest owner.
Owner age is the age of the owner measured in years.
Education dummies in the SCF data diﬀerentiate between a high school degree, a
bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree, a PhD, or another higher degree. For the SSBF data
the classiﬁcation is no high school degree, a high school degree, some college but no degree,
an associate degree, a vocational programme, a college degree, and a post graduate degree.
Ethnicity dummies in the SCF data set are available for White, Hispanic, African-
American and Other. The SSBF data additionally covers Asian, Native Hawaiian or other
Paciﬁc Islander and American Indian or Alaska Native.
Dummy sex of owner is equal to one if the owner is female.
Year dummies are included in analyses using the SCF data. The distribution of obser-
vations according to year is given in table F in the appendix.
4 Development of Hypotheses
4.1 Inﬂuence on Required Returns
In this subsection we present a simple theoretical model in order to show how a positive
relationship between underdiversiﬁcation and proﬁtability can be driven by higher required
returns. This model will be also used to derive the regression speciﬁcation of the empirical
analysis. In the model there are two periods. Individual i invests initial wealth w1i in period
1 and returns realise in period 2. Investment is possible in a safe asset and in a risky asset.
The safe asset has no minimum investment requirement and a return of r0. The risky asset
can be thought of as establishing a company. The size of the minimum investment and the
expected return vary depending on the business idea. The minimum investment requirement
of the risky asset for individual i is denoted by ki. The expected return of the risky asset
is denoted by E(ri), and the realised return of the risky assets is ri. The ﬁnal wealth of
individual i in period 2 depends on whether investment in the risky asset was chosen and, if
this is the case, on the realised return of the risky asset.
w2i = ki(1 + ri) + (w1i − ki)(1 + r0) (1)
13Utility is derived from consumption of w2i. Individuals have a utility function with con-
stant relative risk aversion.
U(w2i) = w
(1−ρ)
2i ; ρ > 0, ρ 6= 1 (2)
In order to compute the minimum expected return that individual i requires for an in-
vestment in the risky asset, E(rimin), suppose the individual is indiﬀerent to investing in the
safe asset only or in the safe and the risky asset. The expected utility from both possibilities
is then identical:
E U | only safe asset = E U | safe and risky asset (3)
This condition can be written with the resulting wealth levels inserted into the utility
function.
(w1i(1 + r0))
(1−ρ) = (ki(1 + E(rimin)) + (w1i − ki)(1 + r0))
(1−ρ) (4)







− 1 = 0 (5)
From a second-order Taylor expansion around r0, we obtain an equation describing the
determinants of the minimum expected return.
E(rimin) = r0 + 1/2 ∗ 1/(1 + r0) ∗ ki/w1i ∗ ρ ∗ E{rimin − r0}
2 (6)
Individual i will invest in the risky asset, if E(ri) is larger than E(rimin). The individuals
underdiversiﬁcation, ki/w1i, increases the minimum expected return required for investment.
If the expected returns are not high enough for the given underdiversiﬁcation, then the
risky asset will not be chosen – the potential entrepreneur will not establish the company.
Furthermore, the required return is increasing in the relative risk aversion, ρ, and in the
volatility of the returns, E{rimin − r0}2.
In the empirical implementation of equation (6) we use the realised return as a proxy for
the required return. For this approach to be valid, it is important that realised returns and
required returns are monotonically related. This is shown in the next equations.
14The expected return for individual i is an increasing function of the minimum expected
return.
E(ri) = α + βE(rimin) + ηi; β > 0 (7)
And the realised return for individual i is equal to the expected return plus an error term.
ri = E(ri) + µi (8)
The realised return, ri, is therefore monotonically related to the minimum expected return,
E(rimin).
ri = α + βE(rimin) + ηi + µi; β > 0 (9)
To derive the regression speciﬁcation we substitute the expression for E(rimin) from equa-
tion (6) into equation (9). After linearising we obtain the following regression speciﬁcation:
ROE = α + β1SNWI + β2dummy high wealth + β3SNWI ∗ dummy high wealth
+β4company size + β5company age + β6industry dummies +  (10)
SNWI is the empirical counterpart of ki/w1i in the model. From our theoretical model we
expect a positive relationship between the underdiversiﬁcation of the owner and the prof-
itability of the company. Since it is not possible to observe the risk aversion of owners in the
data, we employ the common assumption that richer owners are less risk averse. A dummy
for high wealth levels allows a diﬀerent treatment of richer owners. As an overall eﬀect of
high wealth, we expect that the compensation for underdiversiﬁcation will be smaller. The
theoretical model also gives importance to risk, but there is no measure of risk at company
level available in the surveys. The included industry dummies control for risk insofar as it
is the same in one industry. The controls for company size and company age also account
partly for the inﬂuence of risk. The ﬁnal empirical speciﬁcation includes additional controls
that do not appear in the simple model, for example dummies for legal form and education
of the owner-manager.
The simple theoretical model does not allow for an investment in the stock market. In-
vestment is only possible in a save asset and in one risky asset. This is a simpliﬁcation
that should not aﬀect the main insights of the model. Heaton and Lucas (2000c) show that
15growth in proprietary income has a high variation in its correlation with returns to the stock
market. As we cannot observe this correlation on a company-basis, we cannot control for it
in the empirical analysis. Insofar as it is related to the industry, the industry dummies will
control for it.
4.2 Inﬂuence on Eﬀort
Why can there be a positive relationship between the underdiversiﬁcation of an owner with
an active management interest and the eﬀort he is exerting? By working a bit harder
the owner-manager can increase company proﬁtability and thereby reduce the probability
of company failure. The more the owner-manager is ﬁnancially dependent on the success
of the company, the higher are the incentives for eﬀort. The incentive to work harder is
especially high if the company is in diﬃculties, since a company failure has a big impact on
the income and wealth of the owner-manager. After bankruptcy, labour income may be lost
if a period of unemployment ensues; intangible assets, such as customer relationships, are
destroyed and tangible assets can often only be sold with a loss. The eﬀort cost of working
longer hours may be small compared to the ﬁnancial cost of a company failure. We expect
that underdiversiﬁcation has a smaller eﬀect on eﬀort for richer owner-managers, since, in
absolute value, they have more assets to fall back on.
A positive relationship between underdiversiﬁcation and eﬀort is supported by standard
utility functions, but utility functions using consumption relative to a reference point are
an especially good description of the situation of an owner-manager confronted with the
possibility of a bankruptcy (see, for example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). The utility
function is ﬂatter for consumption levels above the reference point than it is for consumption
below the reference point, i.e. there is a kink at the reference point which makes losses
relatively more painful. The reference point can be the consumption level of the last period
or an expectation about future consumption. A company failure may have such pronounced
eﬀects on the ﬁnancial situation of the owner-manager that he may be forced below the
former reference point. Again, higher eﬀort exerted to avoid this negative outcome may be
worthwhile.
164.3 Hypotheses
This section describes the hypotheses that are tested in this paper. The ﬁrst two hypotheses
concern the existence of an underdiversiﬁcation eﬀect.
Hypothesis 1: There is an underdiversiﬁcation eﬀect, i.e. there is a positive relationship
between the owner’s degree of underdiversiﬁcation and the proﬁtability of the company.
This eﬀect can either work through higher required returns or through increased eﬀort.
Hypothesis 2: The underdiversiﬁcation eﬀect is smaller for owners with higher private wealth.
The required returns are smaller if owners exhibit decreasing relative risk aversion and the
incentive eﬀect of underdiversiﬁcation is smaller if the owner-manager is less dependent on
the success of the company.
The next two hypotheses describe a speciﬁc channel through which underdiversiﬁcation
aﬀects proﬁtability. It should be noted that the channels are not mutually exclusive.
Hypothesis 3: A positive relationship between the owner’s degree of underdiversiﬁcation and
the proﬁtability of the company is driven by higher required returns.
Hypothesis 4: A positive relationship between the owner’s degree of underdiversiﬁcation and
the proﬁtability of the company is driven by increased eﬀort.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Dealing With Endogeneity
In order to identify whether there is a positive relationship between underdiversiﬁcation
and company proﬁtability that is driven by higher required returns or higher eﬀort, it is
necessary to deal with the problem of endogeneity. Several regressors used in the analysis
are potentially endogenous. In general, we will use instrumental variables to deal with
this problem. The variable for underdiversiﬁcation, SNWI, is aﬀected by reverse causality.
Owners who know that a company is of high quality are willing to invest more. In this case
there is a positive eﬀect of the equity return on the share of net worth invested. The same
eﬀect is possible for ownership share. Owners may be willing to buy a higher share of a good
17company. Eﬀort can also be inﬂuenced by proﬁtability. Since the reward of working for a
good company is higher, the owner-manager may work longer hours. However, an opposite
eﬀect is also possible. The owner-manager may work longer hours to keep a company of
low quality alive. This could lead to a negative relationship between eﬀort and performance
in an OLS regression. In order to get consistent coeﬃcient estimates, we instrument the
potentially endogenous regressors.10
The following instruments are used for the endogenous regressors: the value of the primary
residence, a dummy for home ownership, the age of the owner, the sex of the owner and
dummies for the type of company acquisition. The instruments are only valid, if there is no
relationship between them and the proﬁtability of the company.
We discuss ﬁrst the validity of the value of the primary residence. Owners with proﬁtable
companies will accumulate wealth over time, which may be used to buy a more expensive
house or to pay oﬀ the mortgage faster. For example, Gersick et al. (1997, p. 157) describe
that the handing down of the company from parents to children can be at a time when the
parents want to move to a larger house. A high value of the house would be related to high
proﬁtability. However, as is shown in the ﬁrst-stage regression for SNWI, the direction of the
eﬀect in the empirical analysis is opposite. We ﬁnd that a high value of the house is related
to low proﬁtability. If there is a relationship between instrument and dependent variable,
then the coeﬃcient for SNWI will be underestimated and we obtain a lower bound on the
true eﬀect. The use of this instrument for ownership share is more problematic. The value
of the primary residence is positively related to the ownership share and the ownership share
is positively related to proﬁtability. If a larger home is bought in response to good company
proﬁtability, then the instrument has a direct relationship with the dependent variable.
In this case the inﬂuence of ownership share on proﬁtability will be overestimated. This
possibility cannot be excluded. However, since the number of instruments is greater than
the number of endogenous regressors, it is possible to test for overidentifying restrictions.
The results of this test are reported along with all regressions.11
10Instrumenting of SNWI is important for a second reason. In the SSBF data it is likely that equity,
which enters into the calculation of SNWI, is measured with error. If the instruments are not related to this
measurement error, then it will cause no bias.
11The results of the second-stage regressions are qualitatively identical when the value of the primary
residence is omitted from the instrument list.
18It can be argued that age of the owner itself is unrelated with proﬁtability. When using
it as instrument, it is, however, important to include a control for work experience of the
owner in the main regression, because work experience can be related to proﬁtability. Since
age is correlated with experience, age can be related to proﬁtability, if no explicit control for
experience is included.12
The sex of the owner should have no direct relationship with proﬁtability. Also, the way
the company was acquired, i.e. being founded, purchased or inherited, should be unrelated
to proﬁtability.
Table 1 presents the ﬁrst stage results to determine the instrumented values.13 The
determinants for SNWI A are shown in columns (1) and (2) for the SCF and SSBF data.
The natural logarithm of the value of the primary residence has a negative eﬀect. This is
as expected since home owners have part of their wealth tied up so that it is not possible
to invest it in a company. The dummy for home ownership has no signiﬁcant eﬀect. Older
owners have a smaller share of their total net worth invested in the company. They have had
more time to accumulate other assets and may have passed on part of their stake to children
or new owners. Women tend to invest a smaller share of their net worth. The dummies for
the way they company was acquired show no clear pattern across the data sets. There is
also no clear presumption on the sign that they should have. As can be expected, SNWI is
higher for larger companies. For company age the eﬀect diﬀers between the data sets.
Columns (3) and (4) cover the determinants for ownership share. The value of the primary
residence has a positive eﬀect and the dummy for home ownership a negative one. Home
owners have part of their assets bound in the home. They have fewer assets available to
invest in a large ownership share. The age of the owner is insigniﬁcant and the sex of
the owner does not have an identical eﬀect across the data sets. Owners have the highest
ownership share, if they have founded the companies themselves. ‘Company founded’ is the
base category in the regression. Company size has a negative inﬂuence on ownership share
12Good instruments should have a higher correlation with the endogenous regressor. The ﬁnding by
Heaton and Lucas (2000b) suggests that this is the case for age. The authors document that the portfolio
composition of individuals is inﬂuenced by their age. Individuals above the age of 65 have a smaller share
invested in private equity. This is also reﬂected in our ﬁrst-stage regression.
13The SCF data includes imputations for missing values. Five diﬀerent imputations are given for each
missing value. The reported results are calculated for the average of the imputed values.
19Table 1: Determining the Instrumented Values
Dep. variable: SNWI A Ownership share Ln hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SCF SSBF SCF SSBF SCF
Ln value primary -3.12*** -2.91*** 1.78*** 1.05*** -0.026***
residence (0.377) (0.322) (0.394) (0.310) (0.0093)
Dummy home owner 0.360 5.09 -5.14** -10.9*** 0.096*
(2.13) (3.24) (2.23) (3.12) (0.053)
Owner age -0.381*** -0.270*** -0.0060 -0.063 -0.023***
(0.054) (0.059) (0.056) (0.057) (0.0015)
Dummy sex of owner -4.72*** -3.14*** 1.98* -1.12 -0.189***
(1.04) (1.17) (1.09) (1.13) (0.026)
Dummy purchased -1.33 6.11*** -4.02*** -1.51 -0.042**
(0.829) (1.18) (0.867) (1.14) (0.020)
Dummy inherited -0.712 7.90*** -11.9*** -3.27* -0.057
(1.46) (1.94) (1.52) (1.87) (0.037)
Company size 4.58*** 0.098*** -5.25*** -0.076*** 0.034***
(0.222) (0.0087) (0.232) (0.0084) (0.0055)
Company age 0.189*** 0.051 0.235*** -0.152*** 0.0020**
(0.037) (0.047) (0.039) (0.045) (0.00094)
Number of observations 4,324 2,337 4,324 2,337 3,335
F-test of excluded 49.2*** 55.7*** 17.8*** 3.10*** 63.3***
instruments F(6, 4291) F(6, 2304) F(6, 4291) F(6, 2304) F(6, 3302)
Shea’s partial R squared 0.055 0.121 0.021 0.0077 0.043
R squared 0.201 0.228 0.478 0.430 0.168
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions contain additional controls for industry, year (only
SCF), education, experience, ethnicity and legal form.
20and company age has diﬀering eﬀects.
In column (5) we report the results for hours worked. This information is only available
for the sub sample of the SCF including owners with an active management interest. Here
it is interesting to note that owner-managers with a more valuable primary residence work
shorter hours. This could be due to an income eﬀect on labour supply. In contrast, owner-
managers who own their primary residence work longer hours. Here it could have also been
expected that owner-managers who own their primary residence have more security and are
less under pressure to work long hours in order to secure the survival of the company.
The instrumenting of SNWI controls for problems of reverse causality, but not for owner-
managers with a high degree of underdiversiﬁcation exerting more eﬀort. As found in the
ﬁrst-stage results for SNWI, an owner-manager with a primary residence of little value has,
on average, a higher share of net worth invested in the company. In this case the owner-
manager is more dependent on the success of the company as there are fewer assets to resort
to and may therefore work harder. Indeed, this was found in the ﬁrst stage for hours worked.
We therefore need to split the sample into owners with and without management interest in
order to separately identify inﬂuences on proﬁtability stemming from higher required returns
and higher eﬀort. However, the division into sub samples of owners with and without a
management interest can also be endogenous, since the decision whether to be active in the
management can be related to the proﬁtability of the company. For example, if the company
is very good, then the owners may have become so rich that it is not worth any more for them
to work. Or, if the company is very good, owners want to work, since returns on eﬀort are
high. However, even if the selection into the group is endogenous, we can still test whether
there are speciﬁc relationships within the groups that are predicted by our hypotheses.
5.2 Is Underdiversiﬁcation Related to Company Proﬁtability?
This subsection discusses the existence of an underdiversiﬁcation eﬀect. It is analysed
whether underdiversiﬁcation of owners has a positive eﬀect on the proﬁtability of companies.
For the moment we do not try to identify separate channels of the underdiversiﬁcation eﬀect,
i.e. the eﬀect can be driven by higher required returns or by higher eﬀort.
Table 2 presents the results of the test of hypothesis 1, which postulates the existence of
an underdiversiﬁcation eﬀect in general. The regressors SNWI and ownership share can be
21endogenous and are instrumented as shown in table 1. There are four diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
Data from the SCF as well as the SSBF is used and both measures of underdiversiﬁcation,
SNWI A and SNWI B, are employed.
Regressions (1) and (2) use the underdiversiﬁcation measure SNWI A and show results
for the SCF and the SSBF data. SNWI A takes only the equity investment into account
and disregards other ways in which owners’ assets could be tied to the company. There is
a positive relationship between SNWI A and return on equity that is signiﬁcant to the 1%
and 5% level, respectively.14 This provides strong evidence for hypothesis 1. It is interesting
Table 2: Underdiversiﬁcation and Proﬁtability
Dep. variable: Return on equity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SCF SSBF SCF SSBF
SNWI A SNWI B
SNWI 1.13*** 1.40** 1.05*** 1.31**
(0.260) (0.591) (0.244) (0.562)
Ownership share 0.769** 5.99** 0.614 5.64**
(0.401) (2.63) (0.384) (2.54)
Company size -2.37 0.233 -3.16 0.180
(2.17) (0.224) (2.19) (0.220)
Company age -0.468** 0.687 -0.377** 0.776
(0.186) (0.594) (0.177) (0.589)
Number of observations 4,324 2,337 4,324 2,337
Overidentiﬁcation test, χ2 1.88 6.89 2.46 7.71
(dof, p-value) (4, 0.76) (4, 0.14) (4, 0.65) (4, 0.10)
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust standard
errors that are adjusted for the 1st step estimation are in parentheses. The regressors SNWI and ownership
share are instrumented. Columns (1) and (2) refer to SNWI A and columns (3) and (4) refer to SNWI B.
The regressions contain controls for industry, year (only SCF), education, experience, ethnicity and legal
form.
14The results for SNWI remain qualitatively identical when the sample is split into companies with limited
and unlimited liability.
22to see whether the economic signiﬁcance is of about the same order in both data sets. The
change in return on equity when SNWI A is increased by one standard deviation is 28.2
percentage points for regression (1) and 34.8 percentage points for regression (2). However,
because one return measure refers to the market value of equity and the other to the book
value of equity, it is more meaningful to examine the change in the distribution. Starting
from the median of return on equity, a one standard deviation change in SNWI A brings the
return on equity up to the 76th percentile in regression (1) and up to the 62th percentile in
regression (2). Underdiversiﬁcation has therefore a sizable eﬀect on company proﬁtability.15
The ownership share has also a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on proﬁtability. This is plausible,
since owners who obtain a higher share of the proﬁts have an incentive to work harder. It
is remarkable that the relative size of the coeﬃcients for SNWI A and ownership share is
opposite to the ﬁnding with the SCF data. Due to the diﬀerences in variable deﬁnition it is,
however, diﬃcult to interpret this ﬁnding. In the SCF data the household is not always the
largest owner, whereas the SSBF data refers only to the largest owner. With the controls for
SNWI and ownership share, we are able to separately identify a positive underdiversiﬁcation
eﬀect and a positive incentive eﬀect.16
Company size and company age are added as further controls. The only signiﬁcant eﬀect
is a negative inﬂuence of age in the SCF data. The regression also includes controls for indus-
try, year, education, experience, ethnicity, sex, legal form and type of company acquisition
included. Their coeﬃcients are not shown for brevity.
Since there are more instruments than endogenous regressors, it is possible to test the
overidentifying restrictions. The test of the statistical validity of the instruments is passed
with a p-value of 76% for the SCF data and with a p-value of 14% for the SSBF data.
Columns (3) and (4) of table 2 show the results for SNWI B. This measure of underdi-
versiﬁcation takes the equity investment, guarantees, private assets used as collateral and
personal loans to the company into account. We do not discuss the results here, because
they are very similar to the results obtained with SNWI A.
15The SSBF data provides also information on total assets. When we use ‘return on assets’ as dependent
variable, we also obtain a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient for SNWI.
16The quadratic terms of SNWI and ownership share have been included in the regression to allow for a
more ﬂexible functional form. Because the quadratic terms were not signiﬁcant, we only use the linear form
of SNWI and ownership share.
23We now turn to the test of hypothesis 2. This hypothesis states that richer owners are
less aﬀected by underdiversiﬁcation, because the absolute amount of wealth not tied up in
the company is higher. We would therefore expect a smaller eﬀect of underdiversiﬁcation for
richer owners. Since only a subset of the observations can be used for the identiﬁcation of this
eﬀect, it will be more diﬃcult to obtain a clear result. Indeed, when we include the dummy
for high wealth and its interaction term, both coeﬃcients are statistically not diﬀerent from
zero, although the results suggest lower returns for richer owners. In an attempt to obtain
a sharper result from the data, we restrict the level eﬀect to zero and work only with the
interaction variable.
Table 3 presents the results for SNWI interacted with the dummy for high wealth. The
estimates show that, indeed, the eﬀect of underdiversiﬁcation is smaller for richer owners.
This is true for all four regression speciﬁcations. Again, both data sets and both measures
of underdiversiﬁcation are used. The coeﬃcient on SNWI that obtains for richer owners is
calculated as the sum of the coeﬃcient for SNWI and its interaction term. It is separately
displayed in table 3. This coeﬃcient is only signiﬁcant for regression (1). For the other
speciﬁcations we observe no eﬀect of underdiversiﬁcation for richer owners. In order to
test hypothesis 2 we also need to know whether there is a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the eﬀect of underdiversiﬁcation for the groups of richer and poorer owners. This is
not the case. Only for column (3) is the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcient of SNWI for both
groups signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to the 10% level.
To sum up, the underdiversiﬁcation eﬀect is not signiﬁcantly smaller for richer owners,
rather there is no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of underdiversiﬁcation at all. It is, however, diﬃcult
to judge whether there is genuinely no eﬀect or whether it can not be identiﬁed with the
limited number of observations. Overall, the evidence that richer owners are less aﬀected by
underdiversiﬁcation is consistent with hypothesis 2, although the results are not signiﬁcant.
Compared to the results without interaction terms, the coeﬃcients of ownership share
remain similar in size, but are generally more precisely measured. Concerning the other
controls, it is suﬃcient to note that company size now has a marginally signiﬁcant positive
inﬂuence on company proﬁtability.
24Table 3: Controlling for Private Wealth
Dep. variable: Return on equity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SCF SSBF SCF SSBF
SNWI A SNWI B
SNWI 1.04*** 1.25** 0.918*** 1.11**
(0.274) (0.581) (0.250) (0.559)
SNWI * dummy high wealth -0.326 -1.00 -0.338** -0.830*
(0.206) (0.658) (0.173) (0.516)
Ownership share 1.01** 5.67*** 0.912** 5.58***
(0.407) (2.03) (0.394) (1.99)
Company size 0.526 0.334* 0.448 0.317*
(2.79) (0.185) (2.82) (0.190)
Company age -0.482*** 0.766 -0.403** 0.812
(0.186) (0.511) (0.176) (0.520)
Coeﬀ. SNWI high wealth 0.718* 0.248 0.580 0.285
(0.423) (1.08) (0.370) (0.949)
Number of observations 4,324 2,337 4,324 2,337
Overidentiﬁcation test, χ2 10.5 7.09 12.4 7.37
(dof, p-value) (9, 0.31) (9, 0.63) (9, 0.19) (9, 0.60)
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust
standard errors that are adjusted for the 1st step estimation are in parentheses. The regressor SNWI and
its interaction term as well as ownership share are instrumented. Columns (1) and (2) refer to SNWI A
and columns (3) and (4) refer to SNWI B. The regressions contain controls for industry, year (only SCF),
education, experience, ethnicity and legal form.
In table 4 we additionally control for eﬀort. This is a ﬁrst attempt to test whether more
underdiversiﬁed owner-managers require higher returns independently of any eﬀect of eﬀort.
If this is not the case, then SNWI should become insigniﬁcant once eﬀort is controlled for.
The SCF data includes information on the owner-manager’s self-reported hours of work in a
typical week, which can be used as a proxy for eﬀort. The variable is a noisy proxy, because
eﬀort is multi-dimensional, whereas hours worked only covers the time dimension. It is,
however, plausible that owner-managers who work longer, will, for example, also acquire
25Table 4: Controlling for Eﬀort
Dep. variable: Return on equity
(1) (2) (3)
SCF SCF SCF
SNWI A SNWI B




Ownership share 1.57** 1.38**
(0.678) (0.628)
Company size -3.14** 1.14 -0.057
(1.39) (3.31) (3.34)
Company age -0.244 -0.661** -0.559**
(0.194) (0.288) (0.267)
Number of observations 3,335 3,335 3,335
Overidentiﬁcation test, χ2 15.4 0.67 0.94
(dof, p-value) (5, 0.009) (3, 0.88) (3, 0.82)
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust standard
errors that are adjusted for the 1st step estimation are in parentheses. The regressors SNWI, ownership share
and hours worked are instrumented. Column (2) refers to SNWI A and column (3) refers to SNWI B. The
regressions contain controls for industry, year, education, experience, ethnicity and legal form.
more information and make better decisions. Regression (1) includes only the logarithm of
hours worked and does not control for SNWI and ownership share. There is a signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect of eﬀort, but the test of overidentifying restrictions is not passed.17 Regressions
(2) and (3) contain SNWI and the ownership share as further controls. The results now show
an insigniﬁcant eﬀect for eﬀort, but SNWI and ownership share remain signiﬁcant. This is
a ﬁrst indication that there is a separate channel of higher required returns, but since hours
17An OLS regression with the speciﬁcation from column (1) was also calculated. The coeﬃcient on
ln hours worked was positive, but insigniﬁcant. This is consistent with the potential endogeneity of hours
worked. If owner-managers of companies with poor quality work more, then the relationship between eﬀort
and proﬁtability is not necessarily positive.
26worked is only an imperfect control for eﬀort, we cannot conclude that the remaining positive
eﬀect of SNWI is only due to higher required returns. It is possible that SNWI proxies for
the parts of eﬀort that are not covered in the time dimension.
5.3 Do Underdiversiﬁed Owners Require Higher Returns?
This subsection covers the ﬁrst proposed channel of the underdiversiﬁcation eﬀect. According
to hypothesis 3 we test whether owners of private companies who are more underdiversiﬁed
require higher returns on their investment. The second sub-sample of the SCF, including
only owners who are not at the same time managers, is used for this test. This excludes
the possibility that a positive relationship between underdiversiﬁcation and proﬁtability is
caused by higher eﬀort. The SSBF data cannot be used for a test of hypothesis 3, because
it does not allow a clear distinction between owners who are and who are not active in the
management. Although 10.7% of the companies have a hired manager responsible for the
day-to-day management, it is not possible to exclude that the largest owner is also involved
in the management.
Table 5 shows the regression results for the SCF data. The ﬁrst- and second-stage re-
gressions contain only variables relating to the household, since it is not possible to select
one member of the household as main owner. In the ﬁrst-stage regression (not reported) the
value of the primary residence has a negative coeﬃcient which is signiﬁcant to the 1% level,
whereas the dummy for home ownership is negative, but insigniﬁcant. The tests for overi-
dentifying restrictions indicate the statistical validity of the instruments. For this subset of
the SCF data we cannot calculate SNWI B, because we have no information on the ﬁnancial
engagement of the household besides the equity investment.
The regression in column (1) shows a positive relationship between SNWI A and return
on equity that is signiﬁcant to the 5% level.18 There is therefore evidence that more un-
derdiversiﬁed owners require higher returns. This eﬀect is also economically signiﬁcant. A
change in SNWI A of one standard deviation increases the return on equity by 18.8 per-
centage points, or, in an alternative representation, it increases return on equity from its
median to its 83rd percentile. It is also instructive to compare the size of this eﬀect with
18We tested whether a quadratic form in SNWI A would be appropriate. Since the quadratic term was
not signiﬁcant, we dropped it again from the regression.
27Table 5: Owners Without Management Interest






SNWI * dummy high wealth 0.173
(0.697)
Coeﬀ. SNWI high wealth 1.07
(1.16)
Number of observations 1,925 1,925
Number of households 1,429 1,429
Overidentiﬁcation test, χ2 0.29 0.59
(dof, p-value) (1, 0.59) (2, 0.75)
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust
standard errors allowing for heteroscedasticity and correlation within households are in parentheses. They
are adjusted for the 1st step estimation. The regressor SNWI and its interaction term are instrumented.
Columns (1) and (2) refer to SNWI A. The regressions contain controls for year and legal form.
the eﬀect of underdiversiﬁcation calculated by Kerins et al. (2004). This comparison can
only be very tentative, since both calculations rely on strong assumptions. We impose a
speciﬁc functional form with our regression speciﬁcation and Kerins et al. (2004) rely on the
applicability of the CAPM and restrict the investment opportunities of the household to a
single company and the market portfolio. Kerins et al. (2004) calculate for companies with
26 – 100 employees that an increase of SNWI from 15% to 25% increases the cost of capital
for an underdiversiﬁed entrepreneur by 9.8 percentage points. We come to a quite similar
result. An increase of SNWI A by 10 percentage points is related to an increase of return
on equity of 9.2 percentage points.
Two small caveats of our empirical results should be pointed out. First, it is not possible
to observe the ownership share of the household for this sub-sample. A higher ownership
share can be related to higher monitoring activities, which can secure higher proﬁtability as
28well. Limitations of the data set prevent us from controlling for this possibility. Second, the
correlation of returns from other ﬁnancial assets (for example publicly traded equity) with
the returns from the private equity investment can inﬂuence the required returns. Since we
cannot observe these correlations, we are also not able to control for them.
The regression in column (2) allows for a diﬀerent eﬀect of underdiversiﬁcation for the
highest third in the distribution of private wealth. The coeﬃcient of SNWI is larger for
richer owners, but it is not signiﬁcant. A test on the sum of the coeﬃcients for SNWI and
SNWI interacted reveals that the inﬂuence of SNWI is not signiﬁcant for the richer owners.
This could be because only one third of the observations is used to estimate the eﬀect, or, it
could be that richer owners of private companies do indeed not require a compensation for
underdiversiﬁcation. There is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients
of both groups.
Our ﬁnding that more underdiversiﬁed entrepreneurs require higher returns as a compen-
sation for the exposure to idiosyncratic risk has important implications. The realisation of a
business idea can depend on the net worth of the potential entrepreneur. If the investment
volume is large relative to the net worth, then the business idea needs to have a higher ex-
pected return in order to be realised. Furthermore, the available volume of additional bank
ﬁnance can also be crucial, since it allows the potential entrepreneur to employ fewer own
resources. The inﬂuence of underdiversiﬁcation is especially important for projects that are
not scalable.
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994a) observe that the probability of becoming an entrepreneur in-
creases after an inheritance and note that this observation is consistent with the existence of
liquidity constraints. Our results suggest an additional interpretation of this ﬁnding. Since
the potential underdiversiﬁcation decreases through the inheritance, the required rate of re-
turn on investment projects decreases and therefore more business ideas will become worth-
while. This alternative explanation does not require the existence of liquidity constraints.
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994b) ﬁnd that an inheritance increases the probability of companies re-
maining in business, which again is consistent with liquidity constraints. Again, an improved
company survival can also be explained by lower required returns after an inheritance.
295.4 Underdiversiﬁcation and Eﬀort
We now turn to the second channel of the underdiversiﬁcation eﬀect. This sub-section
explores the relationship between the underdiversiﬁcation of owner-managers and the eﬀort
they exert, measured as average weekly hours worked. This analysis is solely based on the
SCF data, since the SSBF data does not provide information on eﬀort. Table 6 presents a
tabulation of hours worked according to a partition of SNWI A into the lowest, middle and
highest third. A positive relationship between underdiversiﬁcation and hours worked can
clearly be seen. The diﬀerence between the mean of hours worked for the lowest and the
highest third of SNWI A is also statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In addition, table 6
presents this tabulation separately for owner-managers with diﬀerent levels of private wealth.
It is interesting to note that the diﬀerence in the average of hours worked between the lowest
and the highest third of SNWI is decreasing in private wealth. This is a ﬁrst indication that
the pressure from underdiversiﬁcation could be smaller for richer owner-managers. Here
the diﬀerences in hours worked between the highest and the lowest third of SNWI are also
signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The incentive eﬀect of ownership can lead to a positive relationship between hours worked
and the ownership share. Owner-managers who own a larger share of the company will
beneﬁt more from increased eﬀort – they obtain a higher share of total proﬁts. Table 7
Table 6: Tabulation of Eﬀort With Respect to SNWI A and Private Wealth
Mean (median) of hours worked
SNWI A
Lowest third Middle third Highest third
All owner-managers 44.3 (45) 48.4 (50) 52.8 (50)
Lowest third private wealth 44.0 (45) 49.8 (50) 54.5 (55)
Middle third private wealth 45.8 (50) 49.9 (50) 53.8 (50)
Highest third private wealth 43.0 (40) 45.7 (49) 49.6 (50)
Note: The calculation is based on 3,335 observations. The data source is wave 1989 to wave 2001 of the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Hours worked is the self-reported hours worked in a typical week. The
cut-oﬀ points for SNWI A are 16.2% and 42.2%. The cut-oﬀ points for private wealth are 0.49 million US-$
and 3.3 million US-$.
30shows a tabulation of hours worked according to four categories of ownership. The means
of weekly hours worked are very similar and the median is 50 hours for each category. No
pronounced pattern emerges in this univariate analysis.
Table 8 presents the test of hypothesis 4. It is a test for a positive relationship between
underdiversiﬁcation and eﬀort. Four diﬀerent speciﬁcations are employed. SNWI A and
SNWI B are used as regressors with and without an interaction term for especially rich
owner-managers. In these regressions we cannot instrument SNWI and ownership share,
since most of our instruments are in the regression in their own right. In regression (1) we
use SNWI A without an interaction term as measure of underdiversiﬁcation and ﬁnd that it
has a positive eﬀect, signiﬁcant to the 1% level. Hypothesis 4 is therefore conﬁrmed. There
is evidence that underdiversiﬁcation increases company proﬁtability through the channel of
increased eﬀort. Underdiversiﬁcation also has a sizable eﬀect on hours worked. If SNWI A
is increasing by one percentage point, then hours worked will increase by 8.6%. Ownership
share has a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient as well. Here an increase of the ownership share
by 1 percentage point will increase hours worked by 3.1%.
The eﬀects of SNWI and ownership merit a deeper reﬂection. Incentives emanate not only
from ownership, but also directly from underdiversiﬁcation. Owner-managers whose ﬁnancial
well-being depends more on the success of their companies work harder. This could cast a
new light on the literature discussing the incentive eﬀects of stock ownership and stock option
programmes for employed managers. So far, it was criticised that the income of employed
managers is not sensitive enough to changes in the value of the company and that therefore
incentives to exert eﬀort would be too low (Jensen and Murphy (1990). However, our results
show that ownership can have incentive eﬀects through underdiversiﬁcation, even if the
Table 7: Tabulation of Eﬀort With Respect to Ownership Share
Ownership share <50% 50% >50% and <100% 100%
Mean of hours worked 49.4 48.7 47.3 48.9
Median of hours worked 50 50 50 50
Number of observations 619 329 366 2,021
Note: The calculation is based on 3,335 observations. The data source is wave 1989 to wave 2001 of the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Hours worked is the self-reported hours worked in a typical week.
31Table 8: Underdiversiﬁcation and Eﬀort
Dep. variable: Ln hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SCF SCF SCF SCF
SNWI A SNWI B
SNWI 0.086*** 0.095*** 0.084*** 0.094***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
SNWI * dummy high wealth -0.054*** -0.054***
(0.018) (0.016)
Ownership share 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.029** 0.032***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Company size 0.973*** 1.18*** 0.945*** 1.17***
(0.203) (0.213) (0.203) (0.213)
Company age 0.510 0.055 0.055 0.059*
(0.344) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Owner-manager age 1.09*** 1.11*** 1.08*** 1.10***
(0.186) (0.186) (0.186) (0.185)
Square of owner-manager age -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Coeﬀ. SNWI high wealth 0.040** 0.040**
(0.020) (0.018)
Number of observations 3,400 3,400 3,400 3,400
R squared 0.160 0.162 0.161 0.164
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) refer to SNWI A and columns (3) and (4) refer to
SNWI B. The regressions contain controls for industry, year, education, ethnicity, sex, legal form and type
of company acquisition.
ownership share is quite limited. This implication should be tested speciﬁcally for a sample
of managers of large companies, because they are on average richer than the owner-managers
in our sample. Also, the standard principal-agent models discuss the trade-oﬀ between risk
and incentives only with regard to the variability of the labour income (see, for example,
32Murphy (1999)). Our results suggest that the wealth situation of the manager should be
taken into account as well. The same compensation scheme can provide more incentives for
a manager with a lower level of wealth, because the degree of underdiversiﬁcation is then
higher.
Some of the other control variables have an inﬂuence on eﬀort as well. Owner-managers
of larger companies work longer hours, but the age of the company mostly doesn’t matter.
The age of the owner-manager has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence. Hours worked increases until the
age of 39 and then declines again.
Regression (2) allows for a diﬀerent eﬀect of underdiversiﬁcation for richer owner-managers.
As can be seen from the negative interaction term, richer owner-managers respond less to
underdiversiﬁcation. The total eﬀect for the richer owner-managers can be calculated as the
coeﬃcient of the base category plus the coeﬃcient of the interaction term. The sum of the
coeﬃcients is 0.04 and is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Underdiversiﬁcation has also an eﬀect
on eﬀort for richer owner-managers, but it is smaller than for poorer ones. The diﬀerence
between the eﬀects is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Regressions (3) and (4) use SNWI B as a measure for underdiversiﬁcation. Their results
are very similar to the ones already discussed.
6 Conclusions
Owners of private companies are often underdiversiﬁed. In this paper we study whether un-
derdiversiﬁcation of owners increases company proﬁtability. A positive eﬀect could be driven
by two mechanisms: higher required returns and higher eﬀort. Kerins et al. (2004) show
that underdiversiﬁcation increases the cost of equity capital substantially. On theoretical
grounds we would therefore expect that owners require a compensation for their exposure
to idiosyncratic risk. However, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) ﬁnd that returns to
private equity are, on average, not higher than returns to public equity. So far, it remains
unclear whether owners of private companies do not require a compensation for their ex-
posure to idiosyncratic risk or whether other reasons are responsible for the relatively low
returns to private equity. The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF, wave 1989 to wave 2001)
and the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF, wave 1998) are used for the analysis.
33In our empirical analysis we ﬁnd, ﬁrst, a positive, signiﬁcant relationship between under-
diversiﬁcation and the proﬁtability of companies. This can be either due to higher eﬀort or
to higher required returns. The eﬀect of underdiversiﬁcation is smaller for richer owners,
which is consistent with decreasing relative risk aversion. Second, for a sub-sample of owners
without an active management interest, we also ﬁnd a positive relationship between under-
diversiﬁcation and proﬁtability. This supports the view that underdiversiﬁed owners require
higher expected returns, since higher eﬀort can be excluded as a cause. Third, for owners
who are at the same time managers we establish a positive relationship between underdiver-
siﬁcation and eﬀort, measured as self-reported weekly hours worked. Owner-managers who
are ﬁnancially more dependent on the success of their companies have a higher incentive to
work hard.
The empirical ﬁndings of this paper have important implications for our understanding
of private companies. We show that underdiversiﬁed owners require higher returns as a
compensation for the exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Since idiosyncratic risk is priced in
private companies, it follows that the realisation of a business opportunity depends on the
scale of the required investment in relationship to the net worth of the potential entrepreneur.
If underdiversiﬁcation drives the required return above the expected return of the project,
then the business opportunity will not be realised. There remains the question of why
average returns to private equity are not higher than average returns to public equity. Two
likely explanations are that owners receive nonpecuniary beneﬁts, such as utility from being
ones own boss, or that owners are overoptimistic with respect to the future success of their
companies.
Our ﬁnding that more underdiversiﬁed owner-managers work longer hours has implica-
tions for the eﬃcacy and the design of managerial remuneration schemes. It has been noted
that it is diﬃcult to align the interests of managers and shareholders, when managers have
a low ownership share (Jensen and Murphy (1990). But when the ownership share is high,
underdiversiﬁcation is very costly for managers. The evidence from our analysis suggests
that underdiversiﬁcation itself may induce managers to exert more eﬀort. The strength of
the incentives from a given scheme depends on the share of net worth of the manager that
is tied to company performance.
The positive relationship between underdiversiﬁcation and company proﬁtability does not
34imply that underdiversiﬁed owners realise a gain. It is more likely that the higher proﬁtability
is a compensation for the exposure to idiosyncratic risk and for higher eﬀort. This observation
has an interesting implication for banks extending loans to companies. Since the banks do
not suﬀer a disutility of their own from the owner’s underdiversiﬁcation but gain from the
higher proﬁtability, it can be concluded that companies with more underdiversiﬁed owners
should ﬁnd it easier to obtain bank ﬁnance. A test of this consideration will be attempted
in future research.
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38Appendix
Table A: Descriptive Statistics SCF - Owners With Management Interest
Variable Mean Median Stdev. Min Max
Company information
Number of employees 113 6 459 1 5000
Company age 16.4 14 11.9 1 71
Market value total equity (in m. US-$) 22.9 0.700 394 0.001 24,740
Return on equity (in %) 47.7 14.5 106 -18.7 1071
ROE weighted with equity value (in %) 15.6
Owner information
Net worth (in m. US-$) 15.1 2.08 41.8 0.003 586
Private wealth (in m. US-$) 8.99 1.27 24.9 0.00003 333
SNWI A (in %) 33.7 29.1 25.0 0.039 99.9
SNWI B (in %) 37.3 32.8 26.6 0.039 99.9
Ownership share (in %) 75.9 100 32.4 0.001 100
Value primary residence (in m. US-$) 0.668 0.300 1.29 0 20
Dummy home ownership 0.932 1 0.252 0 1
Experience 29.6 29 13.2 0 85
Hours worked 48.8 50 18.0 1 133
Owner age 52.1 51 12.4 19 95
Dummy sex of owner 0.173 0 0.378 0 1
Note: Descriptive statistics refer to the sample information without weighting. The displayed statistics
reﬂect the variation in the sample, but are not representative for the US economy.
39Table B: Descriptive Statistics SCF - Owners Without Management Interest
Variable Mean Median Stdev. Min Max
Company information
Market value equity share (in m. US-$) 3.14 0.300 12.47 0.001 200
Return on equity (in %) 18.7 1.88 61.2 -24.0 634
ROE weighted with equity share (in %) 11.1
Owner information
Net worth (in m. US-$) 30.6 8.54 66.8 0.009 1018
Private wealth (in m. US-$) 27.4 7.17 63.17 0.003 1018
SNWI A (in %) 12.4 4.28 18.4 0.002 99.8
Value primary residence (in m. US-$) 1.09 0.600 1.74 0 20.0
Dummy home ownership 0.95 1 0.22 0 1
Note: Descriptive statistics refer to the sample information without weighting. The displayed statistics
reﬂect the variation in the sample, but are not representative for the US economy.
40Table C: Descriptive Statistics SSBF
Variable Mean Median Stdev. Min Max
Company information
Number of employees 29.1 5 59.1 1 482
Company age 15.7 13 12.7 1 104
Book value total equity (in m. US-$) 0.993 0.090 3.77 0.001 87.0
Return on equity (in %) 119 41.4 190 -60.0 1006
ROE weighted with equity value (in %) 42.1
Owner information
Net worth (in m. US-$) 1.59 0.468 4.55 0.002 116
Private wealth (in m. US-$) 1.06 0.325 3.75 0 115
SNWI A (in %) 27.7 20.9 24.8 0.004 100
SNWI B (in %) 33.5 24.6 29.3 0.041 100
Ownership share largest owner (in %) 79.6 100 27.8 1 100
Equity value primary residence (in m. US-$) 0.180 0.100 0.390 0 15
Dummy home ownership 0.900 1 0.302 0 1
Experience 20.2 20 12.0 0 72
Owner age 51.3 51 11.3 21 95
Dummy sex of owner 0.21 0 0.41 0 1
Note: Descriptive statistics refer to the sample information without weighting. The displayed statistics
reﬂect the variation in the sample, but are not representative for the US economy.
41Table D: Industry Distribution SCF - Owners With Management Interest
Industry No. of companies % of companies
Agriculture 447 10.3
Construction, mining 410 9.5
Manufacturing 477 11.0
Retail, wholesale 670 15.5
Personal and business services 2,228 51.6
Very large companies, not classiﬁed 27 0.6
Industry unknown 65 1.5
Total 4,324 100
Table E: Industry Distribution SSBF
Industry No. of companies % of companies
Mining, construction 230 9.8
Manufacturing 280 12.0
Transportation, communication, utilities 86 3.7
Retail trade 666 28.5
Services 1,075 46.0
Total 2,337 100
Table F: Observations per SCF Wave - Owners With Management Interest
Wave Number of companies % of companies
1989 590 13.6
1992 915 21.2
1995 928 21.5
1998 934 21.6
2001 957 22.1
Total 4,324 100
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